1 Through laws on communications interception, these service providers have been given the legal obligation to enable and assist interception when law enforcement agencies can show that that the legal requirements are by reference to a relevant legal authorization. 2 Service providers rarely have a vested interest in allowing authorities to eavesdrop on their customers. In fact, adapting their systems and maintaining a constant readiness to assist interception requests or requests for records or historical data is a costly affair that is likely to have no economical or competitive upside. 3 As such, establishing legal rules to require telecommunication providers to assist authorities has likely been a necessary precondition for effective surveillance of such networks.
Beyond the practical need to create access to data only available in networks belonging to private actors, such legal rules are likely to have had other functions as well, by legitimizing the interference with privacy that surveillance entail. It is by now well established that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) require that government measures that encroach on the right to privacy under article 8 of the convention must have a basis in law, and that this legal basis must be sufficiently foreseeable, clear, and limit government discretion. In Sweden, such assistance is required through chapter 6, section 19 of the Electronic Communications Act, whereby the operating of electronic communications networks shall "be conducted so that decisions on secret interception of electronic communications and covert surveillance of electronic communication can be implemented and so that the implementation is not disclosed" (authors translation). Consequently, there is likely to have been a certain synergy between the normative requirements established by the ECHR and the practical reality that legal mandates are necessary to enable surveillance in private networks. The question is: What happens when the assistance of telecommunications providers is no longer necessary for surveillance? When police authorities gain access to direct and unmediated means of surveillance -will legality remain a priority?
In this article, the legality requirement of the ECHR will be analyzed as it relates to IMSI-catchers, a surveillance technology that can covertly locate and gather metadata from a large number of mobile devices within a certain range without the involvement or assistance of mobile network providers. 5 This technology is of particular interest as it has been described as 'direct and unmediated', requiring no involvement by service providers. 6 Furthermore, it is a method that can be described as obscure, as many details of its practical use and legal basis in many jurisdictions is unclear, 7 which highlights the issue of legality.
In order to not only analyze the requirements, but also the impact of ECHR law in this context, the implementation of IMSI-catchers by the Swedish police authority will be analyzed. This case-study further serves to highlight the interaction between domestic law, convention law and EU law as it applies to IMSI-catchers. In this context Sweden makes for an interesting case-study for three primary reasons. First, Sweden has a tradition of transparency with regards to public documents and government action as well as a tradition of a well documented legislative process with detailed official reports as a foundation for legal bills and subsequent legislation. 8 Consequently, official documents regarding the use of IMSI-catchers can be expected to be more available and accessible. Second, the convention 5 See below, chapter 2. 6 Pell SK and Soghoian C, 'Your secret stingray's no secret anymore: The vanishing government monopoly over cell phone surveillance and its impact on national security and consumer privacy ' (2014) pertains to the types of surveillance IMSI-catchers implies. Third, the implementation of IMSI-catchers within the Swedish police authority will be described and then analyzed through an application of convention law and EU-law. Fourth and finally some general conclusions regarding the implications for privacy and protection of communications in relation to unmediated methods of surveillance will be made.
IMSI-CATCHERS GONE WILD

What is an IMSI-catcher?
Very briefly put, the term 'IMSI-catcher', refers to a type of electronic surveillance equipment that collects information about nearby mobile devices. This is done either 9 The convention has a semi-constitutional status through chapter 2 section 19 of the Swedish constitutional 'instrument of government ' ('Regeringsform') (1974:152) , stating that laws may not be enacted contrary to Swedens obligations under the ECHR. 10 Chapter 2, section 20 of the instrument of government, 'Regeringsform' (1974:152 are however generally less precise as they cover a larger area and scoops up more irrelevant identifiers than the use of IMSI-catchers.
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Unlike traditional interception, and due to its direct and unmediated character, the detected use of an IMSI-catcher is difficult to attribute to any particular actor, which also makes it difficult to ascertain if government agencies, foreign actors or private parties are responsible for any alleged surveillance. Indeed, the availability of IMSI-catchers on the open market has been rightly described as the loss of a government monopoly on cell phone surveillance. 
Remaining obscurity
THE NORMATIVE CONTEXT -LEGALITY AND THE ECHR
Legality under ECHR as a normative bedrock
Any law-enforcement deployment of IMSI-catchers in the jurisdiction of signatory states to the ECHR is likely to raise questions regarding the applicability of -and requirements relating to limitations of -article 8 of the convention. 43 In signatory states, the convention article essentially establishes a minimum level of protection for both private life and correspondence (and implicitly, electronic communication). While it is possible for both domestic law, and EU-law to establish a higher level of protection, 44 the ECtHR will regard the convention as establishing the minimum standard and hold states responsible for violations. 45 This implies that convention law is a natural starting point for evaluating the legal requirements relating to the use of IMSI-catchers, before turning to domestic law or EUlaw. 
Some initial observations on applicability of article 8 of the ECHR
The use of IMSI-catchers certainly seems to constitute a prima facie interference with interests that fall within the scope of article 8 of the convention. For the sake of clarity, it is still worthwhile to further analyze the extent of the information IMSI-catchers collect, and the means through which they collect it, both of which fall within the scope of article 8.
While IMSI-catchers have not yet explicitly been the subject of scrutiny by the ECtHR, the Court does not, in practice, assign decisive importance to what particular method or technology that is used for surveillance, focusing instead on the information that have been gathered and the nature and degree of interference with the applicants' private life and 43 Art. 7 of the EU-charter of fundamental rights will in most cases be applicable simultaneously, as the confidentiality of electronic communications falls within the scope of the ePrivacy Directive (see further below, section 5.2), however as art. 7 of the charter corresponds to article 8 of the convention, the ECHR will be the focus of this analysis. Before turning to the more specific case-law relating to these categories of surveillance, it is worth noting that the core principles in this context is under continuous development. The
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has recently delivered a landmark judgment against Russia relating to surveillance of mobile communication networks, 52 this was followed by a chamber judgment against Hungary, 53 both of which reiterated and to a certain extent expanded on the settled principles applicable to interception of communications content toward a more restrictive view on the use of such methods. 54 While it may be difficult to clearly delineate to what extent the more recently developed requirements applicable to content are equally applicable to interception of metadata, the core principles of legality as it applies to surveillance and interception are more settled, equally applicable, and more likely to remain stable. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter will focus on these core principles with only brief observations regarding recent developments. In any case, as the use of IMSI-catchers implies surveillance of telecommunication metadata, geolocation surveillance and, implicitly, some manner of data collection and retention, the relevant case-law becomes a complex interconnected web of cases relating to these contexts.
Metadata surveillance and the quality of law requirement
In 1984, the first case relating specifically to communications metadata was decided by was all the more important as an unfettered power would be contrary to the rule of law:
"Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference". 62 Thus, while the ECtHR has accepted that certain detailed rules relating to the implementation of surveillance measures may not be available to the public through substantive law, it has continuously held that the rules indicating the scope of discretion must be.
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The requirements elaborated above have since then been applied and developed in cases relating to interception and surveillance of different kinds. To no surprise, where no statutory system or substantive law allowing for surveillance has existed at all the court has found a violation of article 8. 64 Similarly, where access to the relevant rules regulating surveillance has been limited, the court has generally attempted to analyze if the scope of the conferred powers are available to the public to allow foreseeability. While more technical and detailed aspects of surveillance may be set out in internal documents and not necessarily available to the public, the legitimacy of such internal rules will in the end depend on the capacity of those details to affect the users' right to respect for their private life and correspondence. If they do, the Court have considered that they must be accessible to the public. 65 Similarly where the government has relied exclusively on non-binding internal guidelines, the court has found a violation of the 'in accordance with the law' requirement.
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The Court has also found a violation in cases where the basis in substantive law has been overly vague and subject to conflicting interpretations. Beyond the foreseeability the Court has consistently held that the relevant rules authorizing surveillance must also be compatible with the fundamental principle of Rule of Law. 68 In the context of surveillance of content, the Court has developed a set of legal safeguards that should be present in the law, to minimize discretion and avoid abuses of power and prevent the dangers associated with secret surveillance: 1) the nature of offences that may give rise to an interception order; 2) a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; 3) a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; 4) the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; 5) the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and 6) and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.
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While most aspects of legality that apply to metadata are the same as those the court has established in relation to content of communication, there are some differences. In P.G and J.H the court indicated that in relation to information about numbers called, the applied principles could be construed in a manner which is somewhat less strict; referring "essentially to considerations of foreseeability and lack of arbitrariness". 70 This implies that certain legal safeguards applicable to interception of content, such as the above mentioned six Rule of Law requirements from Klass, might not apply as strictly to numbers called. This approach by the Court has been regarded as a failure to take into account the type of information that can be gathered through metadata.
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In this context however, it should be noted that developments in the case-law of the 
Geolocation surveillance and the quality of law requirement
The legality requirements mentioned above in the context of metadata mainly apply in the case of geolocation surveillance, i.e. the collection of information regarding the whereabouts of a person, as well. However, some particularities in relation to geolocation surveillance are worth mentioning. The only case specifically dealing with this type of surveillance so far is Uzun v. Germany. 74 The case concerned an investigation into a suspected member of a left-wing extremist terrorist movement. To follow his movement, a GPS-tracker was installed in the car of a presumed accomplice of his, allowing authorities to determine the location and speed of the car (and by association often the suspect and his presumed accomplice) once per minute for some three months until the arrest of the suspect. 75 In determining the applicability of Art. 8 of the convention the Court did not place decisive significance to the fact that the surveillance centered on the car of the presumed accomplice, as the surveillance still allowed the authorities to continuously monitor the suspect, record his movements, draw up a pattern of his movement and collect additional evidence at the places the applicant had travelled to. Evidence that was later used in the criminal case against the 
Implications for IMSI-catcher use
Following this analysis of the case-law of the ECtHR the likely legality requirements applicable to IMSI-catchers may now be summarized. It is clear that neither metadata surveillance nor geolocation surveillance have been seen by the Court as comparable with interception of content in respect of the interference with the right to privacy and communications. Still, it is also established that both types of surveillance are included in the scope of article 8 and necessitates justification under article 8(2). In relation to the requirement that such measures are 'in accordance with the law' it is apparent that beyond the need for a substantive basis in law, the qualitative aspects of access, foreseeability and limited discretion have been highlighted as important. While such foreseeability may stem from continuously developed case law, it still requires that the scope of the powers and discretion given the authorities are clear. It should finally be remarked that these requirements constitute the most basic threshold of a potential justification, subject to a subsequent review of necessity and proportionality under the 'necessary in a democratic society'. However, as will be shown, states may be reluctant to meet even this basic threshold. 83 Ibid, § § 71-72.
THE EMERGENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IMSI-CATCHERS IN THE SWEDISH POLICE
'A method used in nearby countries'
The first official Swedish document reference to the functions of IMSI-catchers can be found in an official report to the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) in 2005. 84 This report highlighted the increased use of refillable cash-cards for cell phones, which had made it difficult to ascertain who used a particular phone. As the report noted, criminals often use, and switch between, many different phones. According to the report, the Swedish Security Service had pointed to how 'nearby countries' made use of a particular equipment that could identify the use of a certain mobile device within a certain area. This method could, according to the authors of the report, be very beneficial in identifying relevant devices in use by a suspect and the authors of the report concluded that the use of this measure should be implemented within the existing legal framework for secret telephone surveillance in the Swedish Code on judicial procedure. This would entail that its use would be subject to a warrant by a court under the same circumstances as traditional metadata surveillance through the assistance of telecommunication providers. 85 The recommendations of the 2005 report relating to IMSI-catchers were, however, never implemented.
'A relatively large scale use'
The issue of IMSI-catchers was revisited in the second official report on police methods in 2010. 86 This report now explicitly referred to the equipment as an 'IMSI-catcher'
and noted that within law-enforcement agencies existed a 'relatively large-scale use of IMSI- 
DIY lawmaking -The internal regulation of an unregulated method
The for which is prescribed a prison sentence of one year or more, or, provided that the method could reasonably be believed to be beneficial for the prevention of such a crime. 97 The authority to decide on the use of the method was placed internally with the commander of the bureau of investigation, his or her deputy, or the commander of the reconnaissance unit. It could be delegated, but not below the rank of commissioner ('Kommissarie'). 98 If the use of the measure was of a particularly intrusive nature the decision had to be made by the commander or his or her deputy. In case of urgency, a police officer, regardless of rank, was allowed to make an interim decision on the use of the method provided it was subject to later review by the unit commander. Some aspects of the internal regulation depart from the suggestions of the 2010 report.
Notably the regulation, as it only affects the internal routines relevant to IMSI-catcher use, does not provide for the external control or oversight suggested by the report. Also, somewhat surprisingly, section 1.3 of the regulation allows for a general deviation from all requirements of the regulation, if so decided by the head of the preliminary criminal investigation within which the method would be applied. 100 In most cases where IMSI-catchers could be applied this role would be placed with a public prosecutor. 101 Importantly, this internal regulation has not been made public nor is the existence of the regulation referenced in any legislative material, inquiries or reports published since its establishment. Requests under freedom of information laws made by this researcher for any internal regulations or guidelines, statistics or procurement decisions relating to IMSIcatchers, 102 was met with a preliminary denial as any such documents would be considered classified. 103 After a request for a definitive decision by the police authority (which may under Swedish law be appealed to a general court of law), the internal regulation was released, while the other requested information was not provided, as it was stated not to exist within the police authority.
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Also of note is that the authority to use IMSI-catchers conferred through the regulation is not based on any rule of law. The regulation points, through a short preamble, to the Swedish constitution, the ECHR, the Police act of 1984 and the Swedish criminal code as support for the enactment of the regulation, but does not provide any specifics to explain these references or how the regulation relates to those legal sources. Indeed, when questioned, the legal department of the police authority maintained that (as of September 2015) the use of IMSI-catchers is 'an unregulated reconnaissance method', that the internal regulation is the only legal basis for its use and that prior to the establishment of the internal regulation, there was no legal basis for the use of This is also manifested in the fact that the recommendations made in the official reports to the Swedish Riksdag have yet to be implemented by the government.
The Swedish Police authority could not provide any information on questions such as "for how long has the method been used?" or "how often is it used?", as the requested information or statistics did not, according to the legal department, exist within the Police authority. Indeed the internal regulation was, according to the legal department, the 'only written regulation of the method'. 106 Thus the only publicly available information on the actual use of IMSI-catchers is still the 2010 report which points to a relatively large-scale use. 107 It is difficult to approximate this statement into any absolute numbers.
The principle that the 'ether is free'
The implementation of IMSI-catchers in Sweden is, as has been mentioned above, primarily based on the assumption that the 'ether is free'. 108 This assumption, often described as a 'principle' in Swedish legal material, stems from the idea that anyone should be free to receive or listen to radio transmissions and is a legacy from the Swedish radio act of 1966.
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The logic behind this principle seems to be that in practice, it is difficult for people to control what signals are picked up by their radio receivers. Accordingly, it would be unfair to apply criminal sanctions on unauthorized individuals that listens to unencrypted signals. 110 It is thus for the sender to secure radio communications through encryption should he or she want to avoid this. This principle also underpinned the signals intelligence gathering of the Swedish Defense Radio Establishment through eavesdropping of (and decryption of) radio 105 Email from the legal department of the Swedish police authority to author (14 September, 2015) communications -foreign and domestic -for decades, with the legislator only stepping in to create a legal basis for interception once the eavesdropping was to be conducted in wired communications as well.
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The principle is also evident from a statement in the preparatory works to the Swedish penal code section on unlawful breaching of computer systems (i.e. 'hacking' or in Swedish 'dataintrång'), 112 where the government argued:
'Regarding data transmitted via radio, however, as a rule, the interception of such radio communications fall outside the criminalized area. It follows from the principle that the ether is free and that the unauthorized access requirement therefore can not be regarded as fulfilled '. 113 Accordingly, the reference to the idea that the 'ether is free' to legitimize the use of IMSI-catchers is not itself grasped from the thin air it refers to. The principle has left a footprint in legislative acts. It is subject to certain exceptions however. Returning to the Swedish preparatory works on unlawful breaching of computer systems, the government did hold that the principle that the ether is free should not apply if the radio-transmitted data are based on statements in preparatory works to the constitutional amendment establishing this right, stating that the protection does not cover 'conversations in public crowds or radio transmissions'.
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The analysis of existing law that has been sketched out above is, though often repeated by the government, an oversimplification. As will be shown, the principle that the 'ether is free' is in fact circumscribed by several points of law that makes it difficult to apply to the use of IMSI-catchers, or in relation to private radio communications whatsoever. In fact, one may reasonably question if the principle in itself survives closer scrutiny.
ANALYZING IMSI-CATCHER LEGALITY UNDER SWEDISH AND EUROPEAN LAW -FROM BAD TO WORSE?
Ascertaining the legality of IMSI-catchers under Swedish law is, to a certain extent synonymous with an investigation into the legality requirements under the ECHR. The
Convention is implemented as Swedish law with a certain semi-constitutional standing through a constitutional rule stating that laws may not be enacted that violate the rights of the ECHR. 117 Also, through a constitutional rule on judicial review, courts are instructed not to apply laws violating the constitution -and implicitly, the convention. 118 Similarly, Swedish government agencies are required not to apply laws if they find that doing so would violate the constitution.
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As mentioned above, 120 an official inquiry did look into the use of IMSI-catchers, and in an addendum to the report of that inquiry the convention requirements relating to several different surveillance methods were thoroughly investigated. As such, the more general conclusion of the inquiry stating that 'a more solid footing in law' of the use of IMSI-catchers 116 Government bill (1975/76:209) would be beneficial, is correct. However, this conclusion is, to a large extent, an understatement.
It is true that the ECtHR has not authoritatively settled the exact requirements of legality, or proportionality for that matter, in relation to IMSI-catchers. Two things are however not in question. First, as has been analyzed above, the use of IMSI-catchers constitutes an interference with the right to private life and correspondence under article 8 of the convention. Secondly, any analysis of the potential legality of the use of the method must start with establishing, at least, that the method is not in fact illegal according to Swedish law.
Any claim to legality, or reference to wiggle-room with regards to the exact requirements of legality, is moot if it can be shown that the use of the method is ultra vires under domestic Swedish law.
Putting the free ether in context
As mentioned above the origin of the principle that the ether is free can be found in the Radio Act of 1966. Section 3 of the act established a basic rule that anyone could have and use a radio receiver. 121 Indeed in the government bill, the minister in charge of drafting the law stated that in a democratic country valuing freedom of speech and freedom of information as some of the most important rights, it was obvious that anyone should have the right to have a radio receiver and listen to any public radio broadcast ('rundradiosändning') that he may pick up on his receiver. 122 Though this statement does indicate a preference for a certain freedom in relation to the ether, this statement, and the rules established by the 1966 act must be put into context.
Primarily, the radio act of 1966 must be understood in the light of that owning a radio receiver had, up to this point, been subject to the granting of a license by the government, something that had become impractical and untenable in the light of how common radio receivers had become. Furthermore, the freedom to listen as described in the bill refers 121 Radio Act (1966:755) . 122 Government bill (1966:149) 'förslag till radiolag ', (Swedish Government 1966), p. 28. explicitly to 'public radio broadcasts', defined in other parts of the government bill as 'intended for the public', in essence; radio programs. In this light it becomes clear that the Radio Act was not intended to create any wideranging exception from the secrecy of communications. The only intent was to secure the right for anyone to listen to public radio programs with a receiver without needing a license.
It did not however preclude criminal liability if the individual used a radio receiver to intentionally intercept private communications. It is clear however that the principle has been given a more extensive interpretation over time. Regardless of the logic of such an interpretation, the question is if this principle can maintain a claim of validity in light of more recent legal requirements stemming from EU-law.
Enter from above: The EU ePrivacy Directive
EU-law enters into this equation through a simple point of fact. By using a mobile phone, an individual is not using a radio transmitter equivalent of a 'walkie-talkie' -openly broadcasting signals to anyone choosing to listen. Though mobile phones contain radio transmitters, the legal implications of the signals they transmit are wider than that. The explicit exception of certain types of unauthorized interception of communication in the Swedish legislation thus seem to be at odds with both the intent and the wording of the directive. Although the Electronic Communications Act prohibits further disclosure of the intercepted information, the directive requires member states to prohibit access, not secondary disclosure. Furthermore, the directive specifically covers the use of technical equipment to intercept content as well as and metadata, regardless of the means of communication. 134 Though the ePrivacy directive through recital 11 does not preclude national rules of lawful interception of communication, it is explicit in requiring that any such measure must be proportional and in accordance with the requirements of such access under the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR. Furthermore, the possibility of authorizing such exceptions should not be confused with the scope of protection required by the directive.
The ether might not be so free after all
All in all, there seems to be several difficulties in applying the principle of 'the ether is free' to IMSI-catchers. The IMSI-catchers used by the Swedish police seem to be of the active variety judging by the information provided by the official report from 2011. 135 As such these are no passive radio receivers which simply gains access to signals in the air. They essentially constitute, as they are described in technical literature, a 'man in the middle attack'
on mobile devices within their range, sending signals identifying the IMSI-catcher as a legitimate mobile base-station. 136 By doing so, they depart from the scenario intended to be covered by the legislative exceptions to confidentiality in the Electronic Communications Act, while approaching the scope of the penal code section on the unlawful breach of computer systems. Furthermore, the exception in the Electronic Communications Act relating to radio interception seems to be, at the very least, a doubtful implementation of the E-privacy directive. Considering that the Swedish rules has to be interpreted in accordance with the directive, in order to fulfill the aims of that directive, 137 IMSI-catchers cannot reasonably be allowed to be exempt from the prohibition on interception.
Lastly, while not the focus of this article, it could be argued that by failing to include electronic communication taking place by radio in the protected area of the Electronic 
Legality through internal regulation?
As has been developed above, the ether might in fact not be as free as the Swedish legislator lets on. At least not in relation to the confidentiality of communications. For the sake of argument, one might entertain the idea that the principle is valid and the ether (at least in Swedish law) is free. Would this make the Swedish IMSI-catching 'in accordance with the law' as required by article 8(2)? Not likely. The principle of the free ether neither confers powers through substantive law, nor does it limit government discretion; it only serves to create a general exemption of certain pathways of communication from protection from government (and private) interception. As such, it fails to meet the quality of law requirements as articulated by the ECtHR and described in chapter 3 above.
A remaining question is however whether the internal regulation of the police authority may constitute a sufficient basis for the use of IMSI-catchers.
As has been developed in chapter 3 above, the ECtHR has delivered several relevant judgments, with the overall conclusion that while certain aspects of surveillance may be regulated through internal rules or guidelines, certain conditions must be met. Thus, the scope of the powers and discretion given to authorities that serve to limit a right must be accessible, 138 Cf. Söderman v. Sweden, no. 5786/08 [GC], 12 November 2013; X and Y v. The Netherlands, no. 8978/80, 26 March 1985 , where the failure of the state to secure criminal accountability for violations of privacy was held as a violation of art. 8 of the ECHR. 139 Alibaba, 'IMSI-catcher' (Alibaba.com) <http://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/IMSIcatcher_135958750.html> accessed 27 April 2016 the internal rules need to be legally binding, and the rules must be precise as to minimize discretion and provide foreseeability.
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Applying these requirements on the internal regulation of 2011, we see that the regulation is found lacking in several respects. Primarily, the regulation is unpublished and only available through a freedom of information request which in turn is dependent on a prior knowledge of what to ask for. The fact that this request was initially denied with reference to confidentiality, highlights the obscurity of these rules to the general public. Furthermore, the internal regulation contains a general exception allowing derogations from the regulation to be made through a decision by the person in charge of a preliminary criminal investigation, seriously undermining the binding character of the regulation in such cases.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is clear that the direct and unmediated nature of IMSI-catchers increases the obscurity of the method, as law enforcement agencies can apply the method without outside assistance. This may also serve to incentivize further obscurity, as any challenges to the legality of its use will be dependent on outside knowledge of such use. Given the Swedish lawmakers apparent hesitance to explicitly legitimize the use of the method through substantive law despite several official reports suggesting this, the Swedish police seem to have responded by enacting its own internal guidelines. As this article shows, this has done little, if anything, to ensure compliance with the ECHR. Meanwhile, the principle of 'the ether is free' has given authorities a manner of legal plausible deniability as it has in practice made certain communication pathways exempt from privacy protections under Swedish law.
This principle is likely to have delayed the implementation of a specific legal mandate for the use of IMSI-catchers. The principle of the free ether cannot however survive scrutiny under European law. In fact, the exceptions to the normative privacy protections it has resulted in might, in and of themselves, be regarded as a violation of article 8 of the ECHR and Swedish 140 See chapter 3 above.
responsibilities under EU-law. That references to the principle has allowed Swedish authorities to apply IMSI-catchers in a manner which must be seen as contrary to article 8 of the ECHR only serves to further illustrate the problematic nature of this principle.
Given that two separate inquiries over a number of years have pointed to the need for a solid legal basis for IMSI-catcher use, the recalcitrance of the Swedish legislator must reasonably be attributed to an unwillingness to surround this method with more stringent safeguards. The requirements of legality in the ECtHR case-law are not new, neither is the appreciation of the problems the principle of the free ether implies. As early as 1992, a
Swedish government report highlighted that the principle would likely have to be abandoned as the amount of communication worthy of protection using radio signals was increasing, and as there was low foreseeability for individuals regarding the pathways their communications would use. 141 Given how several legislative initiatives relating to surveillance requiring the assistance by service providers have been taken since the first report mentioning IMSIcatchers, one might reasonably question the delay with regards to IMSI-catchers. One explanation, mentioned in the beginning of this article, is the fact that a legal basis is not, in the case of IMSI-catchers, needed to force private companies to facilitate surveillance.
Beyond the issues relating to the domestic legal basis for IMSI-catcher surveillance this article highlights other concerns. 
